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L’objectif de cette étude était d’examiner, auprès d’un échantillon de 325
organisations, l’influence des construits clés relatifs à la théorie de l’agence, la théorie
des coûts de transaction et la théorie de la dépendence des ressource sur la proportion
du salaire dans l’enveloppe de la rémunération directe du personnel de vente. Le
niveau de programmation des tâches, la capacité à observer les comportements, les
opportunités de carrière et les ressources financières offertes étaient associés à une
augmentation du recours de la composante salariale. En revanche, le degré de difficulté
à mesurer les résultats, la disponibilité de ressources reliés aux produits/services et un
grand différentiel de performance étaient associés à une diminution de la composante
salaire. Les résultats supportent l’argument de l’intégration d’une multitude de
perspecttives théoriques pour expliquer le choix des stratégies salariales.
The purpose of this study was to investigate, using data gathered from 325
French-Canadian organizations, the influence of key constructs related to agency,
transaction cost and resource dependence theories on the proportion of salary in sales
compensation. Level of task programmability, capacity to observe behavior, career
opportunities and financial resources offered were associated with an increased use
of salary pay. In contrast, difficulty of measuring result outcomes, availability of
product/service-related resources and high marginal sales force productivity were
associated with decreased use of the salary component. Results supported the
argument that integration of multiple theoretical perspectives offered a better
explanation of pay policy. However, the results have not supported the ability of
market and selling uncertainty to predict the proportion of salary.
Mots Clés : Représentants aux ventes, rémunération, théorie de l’agence,
théorie des coûts de transaction, théorie de la dépendance des
ressources
Keywords : Sales, compensation, agency theory, cost analysis theory, resource
dependence theory
1Introduction
Sales force employees play a key role in organizations (Milkovich, 1988). It is
therefore not surprising that the question of their compensation has strategic
implications. The literature on sales compensation and sales force management
proposes a wide range of factors that potentially influence the percentage of
salary versus incentives in sales compensation plans. Four conceptual
perspectives tend to provide useful insights on sales compensation: agency,
transaction costs, resource dependence and institutional theories (Barringer &
Milkovich, 1998). In the compensation context, the agency theory has been the
perspective studied most often (e.g. Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1990; Roth & O’Donnel, 1996; Stroh et al., 1996). The transaction
cost perspective was investigated by John and Weitz (1989) and the resource
dependence perspective by Pfeffer & Davis-Blake (1987). Eisenhardt (1988)
alone used multiple theories — agency and institutional perspectives — to
explain pay policies. To our knowledge, no research to date has considered
agency, transaction cost and resource dependence theories simultaneously. In
addition, earlier studies on sales compensation have mainly been done with US
respondents. This study, using data collected from French-Canadian
organizations, provides an opportunity to verify whether these three theories can
be applied to diverse cultural environments.
However, as Barringer & Milkovich (1998) have pointed out, the potential for
integrating several theories without creating redundancy and incongruity may be
limited. While some convergence exists between these theories, each theory
apparently has distinctive attributes and key constructs. Agency theory posits
that observability of performance and uncertainty are determinants of control
(Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989). The major contribution of transaction cost theory is its
consideration of specific human assests (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998).
Furthermore, resource dependence theory assumes that the control of critical
resources can influence decisions about pay (Balkin & Bannister, 1993).
This article will begin with a discussion of agency theory. Two key constructs of
this theory will be explored: observability of performance and uncertainty of the
sales environment. Hypotheses regarding relationships between these two key
constructs and proportion of salary will be formulated. Second, the transaction
cost perspective is presented. A number of hypotheses related to transaction-
specific assets will be postulated. The third theory mentioned will be that of
2resource dependence, followed by several hypotheses regarding control of
critical resources. After a discussion of the results, the paper sets out the
limitations of the study and its practical implications, and make some
suggestions for future research.
Theories and Hypotheses
Agency Theory: The Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework provided by agency theory is preferred by authors in
the field of sales compensation. The theory has its roots in neoclassical
organizational economics theories, and can be summarized as the formation of a
contract between two parties: the principal (the organization) and the agent (the
salesperson). The contract is based on two issues: (1) the agency problem, which
presupposes a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, and the
difficulty for the principal to verify how the agent is actually behaving; and (2)
the risk sharing problem, which presupposes a different attitude to risk on the
part of each of the two parties.
As the theory suggests, an agency problem occurs when the principal is unable to
adequately monitor the agent’s behavior toward the mandate (in this case, the
sale of products and/or services). The importance of the principal’s (the firm)
having information on the performance of the agent (salesperson) arises from the
fact that the interests of the two parties may be contradictory. For the principal,
the main objective is to maximize profits, while the agent strives to maximize his
or her own compensation. Faced with this clear contradiction, the principal must
ensure that the agent will act in the best interests of the firm. To do so, it can
select one of two alternatives: it can obtain information on the salesperson's
behavior, or it can link the salesperson's compensation to sales results or
outcomes. In the former case, the principal needs to know what the agent is
doing (Eisenhardt, 1985). Information on the behavior of its salespeople allows
the organization or principal to ensure that they will act in the principal’s best
interests, thus resolving the agency problem. In reality, if the organization knows
how its salespeople are behaving, it can pay them a fixed salary since it knows
they will act in accordance with the mandate. It will subsequently opt for a
"behavioral" type of contract, such as a salary-only compensation plan. In the
3latter case, the most obvious way of countering the agency problem is to offer
the salespeople a "results" contract, whereby they are paid on commission or in
the form of bonuses according to sales made. However, this option has the effect
of transferring the risk to the agent and increasing his or her level of uncertainty.
A salesperson’s efforts may not necessarily lead to actual sales, thus creating a
certain amount of financial risk for that person. As a result, salespeople who
work in markets with a high level of uncertainty will probably be less willing to
accept a contract based entirely on sales outcomes, unless a substantial premium,
in the form of a higher commission, is offered. However, this information comes
with its own price tag; the ultimate goal of the organization is to identify the best
possible contract that successfully balances the cost of the premium required by
the salesperson in exchange for shouldering the environmental risk, and the cost
of acquiring information on the salesperson’s performance and behavior. This
balance may be achieved by a "hybrid" contract, similar to a mixed
compensation plan, under which part of the compensation is paid as a fixed
salary and the other part as a variable sales-related commission. Two concepts
therefore emerge as explanations for the type of contract to be offered to sales
staff: first, the organization’s ability to obtain information on the performance of
its salespeople, and second, the level of uncertainty the salespeople face.
A- The Level of Information on Sales Force Performance
From the agency theory standpoint, the choice between salary compensation and
compensation with a substantial commission component is contingent on the
organization’s ability to monitor or assess sales force performance. Three factors
are examined below: the level of job programmability, the possibility of
observing behavior and the ease with which outcomes can be measured.
A programmable task is one whose requisite behaviors can be precisely defined
(Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1988). If behavior is required to achieve desirable
outcomes, sales managers can employ behavioral controls. Two studies by
Eisenhardt (1985, 1988) in the retail sector showed that the level of job
programmability was positively related to the use of a behavioral control in the
form of a salary-based plan. Stroh et al. (1996) recent study of a sample of
middle managers showed that a high level of task programmability was
associated with a more infrequent use of variable pay. Along the lines of
4Eisenhardt and Stroh et al, we can postulate that the greater the level of job
programmability, the greater the organizational preference for behavioral control
in the form of a larger fixed-compensation component in total compensation.
This leads to our first hypothesis, H1.
Hypothesis 1: The level of job programmability will have a
positive impact on the amount of fixed compensation in total
compensation.
Regarding the ability to measure behavior, Eisenhardt (1985, 1988) found that
the span of control over the sales force was negatively related to the role of
salary. This is based on the argument that a restricted span of control allows
sales supervisors to keep a closer eye on their staff and to obtain information on
employee behavior more easily. The resulting investment in information leads
employers to prefer salary compensation plans. The difficulty and cost of
measuring performance have also been examined in the literature. John and
Weitz (1989) found a positive relationship between the level of difficulty of
measuring outcomes (sales, costs). the contribution of salespeople (input) and
the preponderance of the role of salary. Eisenhardt (1985) observed that the cost
of acquiring information on sales force performance was related to the presence
of a behavioral control - in other words, to the use of a salary plan. Kowtha
(1997) showed that performance ambiguity was more strongly related to
behavior control than output control. From a slightly different perspective,
Anderson (1985) showed that the decision to use an internal (salaried) as
opposed to external (commission-based) sales force depended partly on the
difficulty in measuring sales force performance objectively, for example in terms
of sales and costs. The literature suggests that the possibility of observing
behavior is related to the use of a behavioral control, entailing a larger salary
component in total sales compensation. This leads to our second hypothesis, H2.
Hypothesis 2: The possibility of observing sales force behavior
will be positively related to compensation that includes a larger
salary component.
The difficulty of measuring outcomes is enhanced if the sales force is required to
engage in nonselling activities, and if input from other people is needed to close
sales. The will of organizations to establish longer-term relationships with their
customers, and the growing importance of the consumer both demand better
5sales support and the execution of nonselling activities (Anderson and Oliver,
1987; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; John and Weitz, 1989). Recent research
has shown that performance in nonselling activities had a positive impact on
sales results (Cravens et al., 1993). However, it is more difficult to assess
performance when salespeople engage in nonselling activities, since their impact
on future sales is somewhat uncertain and certain activities may be carried out
without the organization’s knowledge (John and Weitz, 1989).
Moreover, team selling--which occurs when input from several people is
required to close a sale--raises the problem of assessing individual contributions
(Ouchi, 1979). In a context marked by high level of task interdependence,
whereby a sale is made jointly by two or more salespeople or where salespeople
need to work in collaboration with other organizational players (engineers,
technicians, etc.), assigning individual responsibility for the sale is more
complicated and, consequently, so is allocation of the reward (John and Weitz,
1989; Coughlan and Sen, 1989). To solve this problem, the organization can opt
either for team incentives or salary compensation to reward individuals who
contributed to the sale of the product or service (Basu et al., 1985; Johnson,
1993). The former option is appealing, but creates its own problems (e.g. free-
riding, less recognition for better contributors). Two studies highlighted the
influence of teamwork in sales. As expected, John and Weitz (1989) found a
positive link between team selling and the presence of a compensation policy
based mainly on salary. Cravens et al. (1993) observed that salespeople paid
mainly by salary were more likely to prefer team selling, and that this type of
compensation policy could be effective. In light of these results, we propose the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3A: The difficulty of measuring sales outcomes will
be positively related to a larger salary component in total
compensation.
Hypothesis 3B: The importance of sales support activities will be
positively related to a larger salary component in total
compensation.
Hypothesis 3C: The presence of sales made jointly by several
individuals will be positively related to a larger salary component
6in total compensation.
B- Level of Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
From the agency theory perspective, the choice between salary compensation
and compensation with a substantial commission component depends on the
level of uncertainty in the sales environment and on the capacity or will of the
salespeople to accept the financial risk. The risk to the salespeople is that their
effort will not produce a sales outcome. The level of risk faced by the agent is
closely related to the level of uncertainty. Several sources of uncertainty exist,
some related to the sales environment and others to resources available to the
individuals.
Uncertainty in the sales environment can stem from at least two sources: the
product’s sales potential on the market, and the duration of the product sales
cycle. A high-growth product with a large market share generates less
uncertainty than a product with uncertain growth and a small market share.
Agency theorists argue that a high level of uncertainty necessarily leads to less
recourse to variable pay (Einsenhardt, 1989). Research by John and Weitz
(1989), Eisenhardt (1988) and Kowtha, (1997) has shown that in organizations
experiencing a high level of sales instability, extreme difficulty in forecasting
sales accurately and a high level of uncertainty about task and sales outcomes,
personnel tend to be salaried and control is focused on behavior. In contrast,
theoretical prescriptions and empirical studies of strategic compensation
contradict agency theory to some extent on this point. These studies suggest that
in a context of high uncertainty, organizations must become increasingly
flexible, and thus shift from a fixed-salary-based compensation plan to one with
a high proportion of variable pay (Stroh et al., 1996). Research by Balkin and
Gomez-Mejia (1990 and 1987) showed that mature firms (less uncertainty)
tended to favor more salary-oriented compensation, whereas firms in the
introductory phase (more uncertainty) tended to prefer a larger incentive
component. Stroh et al. (1996) found that the level of uncertainty was associated
with an increase in variable pay. It should be noted, however, that neither study
was concerned specifically with salespeople, and the life cycle measure was
organization-related rather than product-related.
7Some authors have also highlighted the impact of sales cycle duration within the
agency theory framework (Coughlan and Sen, 1989; Johnson, 1993). They argue
that as the length of time between the initial contact and the closure of the sale
increases, so does environmental uncertainty, along with the risk faced by the
salesperson. Moreover, in a long sales cycle, measuring the outcome would not
enable the organization to identify a reduction of effort by the salesperson. This
type of behavior may actually affect the duration of the sales cycle, because if the
sale had been made sooner, other customers could have been approached. In
such cases, behavioral control in the form of a larger salary component in total
compensation is recommended, to encourage salespeople to adopt a long-term
approach and to invest time in future sales (John and Weitz, 1989). The work of
Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) contradicts certain precepts of agency theory
related to uncertainty. These authors observed a link between the number of calls
made to close a sale (greater uncertainty) and the use of incentive-based
compensation. From the agency theory standpoint, we can nonetheless postulate
that a higher level of uncertainty in the sales environment and sales closure
should increase the role of salary in total compensation.
Hypothesis 4: Uncertainty concerning sales outcomes will be
positively related to a larger salary component in total
compensation.
The resources available to the salesperson, whether in the form of price
negotiating power with the customer, the range of products or services sold or
similar elements, may reduce the level of uncertainty and, to some extent,
facilitate closure of the sale (Lal, 1986; Lal and Srinivasan, 1993). Two types of
resources may be made available to the salesperson to facilitate the sale and
reduce uncertainty: product resources and financial resources. To date, only John
and Weitz (1989) have considered the impact of resources. They showed that the
more product resources salespeople have at their disposal (e.g. the possibility of
negotiating the product price), the smaller the salary component in total
compensation. This leads us to propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The more product-related or service-related
resources available to salespeople, the smaller the salary
component in total compensation.
Expense accounts may be cover some of the expenses that salespeople incur as
8part of their jobs - for example, vehicle expenses or expenses for attending trade
fairs or conferences. A salesperson who does not have an expense account will
be personally responsible for such expenses, and will thus run a higher risk, since
he or she will have to invest financial resources and personal effort with no prior
guarantee of the outcome. From the agency theory standpoint, the expense
account is therefore a way for the organization to share the risk with the
salesperson, who has a natural risk aversion. On this point, the results obtained
by Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) were ambivalent. They found that sales
expenses were negatively related to salary, whereas travel expenses were
positively related. In the light of these results, we can propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: The extent of the financial resources available will
be negatively related to a larger salary component in total
compensation.
Transaction Cost Analysis: The Theoretical Framework
Transaction cost analysis emerged initially from the work of Williamson (1975,
1979, 1985) and, like agency theory, is based on institutional economics. It is
distinguished from agency theory by the notion of "contract" (called
"transaction" in this case). Transaction cost analysis takes for granted that most
contracts are incomplete (because of the limited rationality of the actors and the
uncertainty of the outcome) and requires that mechanisms be introduced to avert
a situation where the parties, through self-interest, fail to fulfil their obligations
(opportunism, in the sense of deceit).
The major contribution of this theory is its consideration of "transaction-specific
assets" (TSAs). These are defined as elements held by one of the parties which
render the other party dependent. Transaction-specific assets are attached to a
single element and therefore cannot be used for another purpose. They may
reduce pressure from competition (market failure) and render their holders
powerful and in a position to cheat the organization. For this reason, it is
recommended that mechanisms be developed to reduce the cost of these
elements to a minimum. Consequently, the organization will have to make a
choice (often forced) between the transaction costs generated by a "behavioral"
9(or hierarchical) control system and those generated by a "results" control system
(market laws). The inherent costs of the former include the investment in
behavior observation mechanisms to ensure that the salespeople perform their
duties in the desired way. The firm thus reduces its level of uncertainty regarding
the performance of its salespeople. When an organization is not faced with a
high level of uncertainty and is not dependent on the TSAs of its salespeople, it
will tend to opt for market laws, or a "results" control system. The goal here is to
reduce the risks of opportunism on the part of the salespeople and to generate a
satisfactory effort level. However, this type of system may generate high result
measurement costs, which must be considered transaction costs. The costs
related to the specific nature of the TSAs and the market laws may lead
organizations to attain effectiveness through the use of a "hybrid" type of
contract.
To our knowledge, John and Weitz (1989) are the only authors to have
attempted to test the link between the TSA construct and the percentage of salary
in total sales compensation. Two assets are particularly relevant for our study:
investment in training and existence of a career plan. Training, especially in the
organization’s procedures and products or services, can be described as a
transaction-specific asset, because knowledge of one organization’s procedures
and products is difficult to transfer to another organization. The influence of
training on the role of salary has not yet been clearly identified. Coughlan and
Narasimhan (1992) found that neither the training budget nor the duration of
training explained the type of compensation paid to salespeople. These
inconclusive results suggest that further investigation of the phenomenon is
required.
The existence of a career plan for salespeople may also be a TSA, since it
provides the salespeople with an opportunity to build a career within the
organization. It may actually replace higher short-term income. The better the
career prospects for salespeople, the higher their future compensation is likely to
be (Coughlan and Narasimhan, 1992). Since income potential is higher when
compensation is incentive-based, the presence of a career plan for salespeople
should be strongly indicative of salary-based compensation where promotion
prospects provide the incentive. Solely Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) have
tested this hypothesis. They found a significant positive relationship between the
existence of a career plan and a larger salary component. As a result of their
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work, we suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: Career prospects will be positively related to a
larger salary component in total compensation.
Resource Dependence Theory: The Theoretical Framework
The resource dependence model assume that management decisions are
influenced by internal and external agents, who control critical resources (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). The resource dependence perspective suggests that some
jobs within organizations control resources vital to the survival of the
organization. Groups of employees holding these critical jobs are able to derive
power from the control of important resources (Balkin & Bannister, 1993). This
power can be used to influence decisions over the formulation of pay policies in
keeping with the preferences of the incumbents. Bartol & Martin (1988) identify
four attributes that affect employee control over resources: 1) the degree of
uncertainty surrounding the achievement of the task; 2) the importance of task
achievement to the organization (centrality); 3) the ease with which the work can
be observed and measured, and 4) the level of skill specialization required to
perform the tasks. Pfeffer & Davis-Blake (1987) suggest that the degree to which
organizations are dependent on a position may be defined by two variables: the
criticality of the position and the substitutability of the position. The resource
dependence perspective suggests that the sales representative may play a critical
role in the firm when it is able to control the relationship with the customer and
the flow of revenues (Balkin & Bannister, 1993). We argue that the level of
competency of the sales force and the level of centrality and substitutability of
the sales position influence the pay policy of this strategic employee group.
A competent professional sales team requires fairly stable compensation and a
relatively high salary to recognize the true value of the salesperson’s opportunity
cost of time (Coughlan and Narasimhan, 1992) and to retain the best elements of
the organization. These authors observed that the level of education and seniority
were positively related to the role of salary. Similarly, Cravens et al., (1993)
showed that professional competency was closely related to salary
compensation. Generally speaking, salespeople who have made a significant
investment in human capital (education, specific experience) are, all other things
11
being equal, in a better position to demand safer compensation because of the
value of their assets on the job market (Lal and Srinivasan, 1993; Basu et al.,
1985). We therefore suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8: The level of competence (education, experience) of
the sales team will be positively related to a larger salary
component in total compensation.
Nonetheless, highly competent salespeople are more likely to see their efforts
rewarded by sales outcomes than less competent salespeople. According to
Coughlan and Sen (1989), the most productive salespeople should receive a
higher portion of variable compensation, because their marginal contribution to
the organization’s profits is greater than that of their average or weaker
colleagues. These critical employees, who control vital resources, namely sales
income, are in a better position to capture a portion of their value added to the
organization through the pay system (Balkin & Bannister, 1993). The variable
portion of total compensation should conceivably increase while the
performance of individual salespeople in the same sales team differs widely, to
the employees’ marginal contributions and to retain these valuable individuals.
Hypothesis 9: As the disparity between the performance of the
salespeople increases, the salary component in total
compensation should decrease.
The sales representatives control relationships with the customer when the firm
depends primarily on personal selling to the customer to close the sale
(Eisenhardt, 1988). In contrast, when a firm spends heavily on advertising and
sales promotions to influence customers, the sales representatives is no longer
the primary factor that influences the customer to buy the product (Balkin &
Bannister, 1993), defined as "the predominance of the role of the salesperson in
closing sales" (Schultz, 1987; Moynahan and Locke, 1988; Gomez-Mejia and
Balkin, 1992). Although the effect of the marketing mix strategy on
compensation has not been examined, a number of specialists have suggested
that investment in certain elements of the marketing mix may diminish the role
or importance of the salesperson in closing the sale, and thus the need to pay
incentive-based compensation (Coughlan and Sen, 1989; Blessington, 1992;
Johnson, 1993; Cespedes, 1990; Anderson et al., 1992). Moreover, some authors
have suggested that compensation for salespeople with low marginal
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productivity due to the influence of factors beyond their control on sales closures
(low predominance) should be mainly salary-based (Coughlan and Narasimhan,
1992; Lal and Srinivasan, 1993). We therefore suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 10: The predominance of the salesperson in the
organization’s marketing mix will be negatively related to a larger
salary component in total compensation.
Labor market conditions may affect the extent to which an organization is
dependent on external agents for critical human resources. Conditions in the
labor market determine the ease which critical resources can be replaced
(Barringer & Milkovich, 1998). Replaceability or substitutability may effect
dependence on employee resources and consequently the role of salary. For
instance, a high sales staff turnover may suggest that it is fairly easy for
salespeople to find other jobs, and for the organization to recruit replacements.
This suggests that a more effective contract would compensate the sales force
with a higher percentage of variable compensation, and thus bring the market
into play. To our knowledge, only John and Weitz (1989) have tested the
influence of this particular element. They found a weak positive relationship
between the difficulty of replacing salespeople and a higher salary component in
total compensation. We can therefore suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 12: The level of sales staff turnover will be negatively
related to a larger salary component in total compensation.
Control variables
A number of organizational variables may also influence sales compensation
significantly and should be controlled in any study seeking to test control theory
predictions (Stroh et al., 1996). At the organizational level, an organization’s
industry membership (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Stroh et al., 1996) and size
(Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Tremblay & Marcoux, 1994; John & Weitz, 1989)
should be taken into account.
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Methodology
Sample
The relationship between the size of the salary component in total sales
compensation and the variables obtained from the concepts discussed above was
assessed using a questionnaire written in French. The questionnaire was
developed and pre-tested in personal interviews with seven sales managers, and
then mailed to a wide variety of organizations. The sample was taken from a
bank of sales managers provided by a specialized sales management training
firm. The bank contained details of nearly 4,000 sales managers (name, address,
sector). Sales managers were selected as informants for this research because
these individuals are most knowledgeable about sales compensation policies in
the firm. In most organizations sales compensation administration occurs within
the sales unit of the firm because sales compensation is a critical component of
sales and marketing strategy (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992).
Survey participants were selected on the basis of economic sector representation,
geographical location and the number of managers per organization. The aim
was to obtain respondents from different sales environments. After application of
the selection criteria, the list of managers obtained from the database was
reduced to 2014. Although at first we felt it would not be useful to send the
questionnaire to several sales managers from the same establishment, we
eventually decided, where possible, to ask two managers from the same
establishment to complete the questionnaire, to maximize the chances of a
response. Our decision was amply justified by the number of mailed
questionnaires returned unopened because the person concerned no longer
worked for the organization or because the address was incorrect. The
questionnaire was ultimately mailed to all 2014 sales managers in 1247
establishments in Quebec. The Canadian sample provided an opportunity to
gather data in a different cultural environment than earlier studies on sales
compensation, which mainly covered US and UK respondents. Three weeks
after the first mailing, we faxed a reminder to 100 sales managers whose
establishments had not yet responded and whose fax number was available. The
response rate, calculated as the number of completed questionnaires received as
a percentage of the number of establishments to which at least one questionnaire
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was sent (325/1247), was 26.1%1. Our study is therefore based on a sample of
325 establishments that completed the questionnaire. The highest number of
responses was obtained from the manufacturing sector (32%), followed by the
finance, insurance and real estate sector (28%), retail sales (17%), transportation,
communications and public utilities (15%) and services (6%). The average
number of salespeople per establishment was 14, and the average number of
managers supervising the sales team was two. Respondent establishments had an
average sales turnover of $20.5 million, and more than half had less than 100
employees. Generally speaking, sales employees had a college education, 12
years of experience in sales, and had worked for the organization for an average
of six years. With respect to compensation, 29% of respondent establishments
paid their salespeople on commission only, 11% by salary only and 60% had
compensation plans comprising a salary component combined with one or more
incentives (commission, bonus, profit-sharing).
Measure of Independent Variables2
Two theoretical concepts inherent to control theories were explored in this
research: information on agent performance and environmental uncertainty.
Three indicators were used to define the concept of information on agent
performance: the level of job programmability, the possibility of observing
behaviors and the possibility of measuring outcomes. To measure job
programmability, we used one item from Eisenhardt’s (1985, 1988) construct. To
assess the ability of managers to observe the behaviour of their salespeople, we
used four measures. Like Eisenhardt (1985), we used the ratio (ratio) of sales
team size to total number of direct sales team supervisors. Two additional items
were examine: the workplace (on the road, coded 1, or in the office, workplace)
and the number of days on the road (days on the road). To assess the ability to
measure performance, we used four measures. The first estimated the ability to
measure performance as output (measure of outputs). This was done with three
statements, the first two taken from the work of John and Weitz (1989) and the
                                                
1. In cases where two sales managers from the same establishment responded to the survey, the
redundant questionnaire was eliminated from the sample. Thus, each establishment in the sample
is represented by the responses of one sales manager.
2. Appendix 1 presents the definition, measure and reference construct for each of the variable
studied.
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third developed specifically for our study. This latter dealt with the presence of a
computer system to verify salesperson performance by means of quantitative
measures. It produced a fairly satisfactory internal confidence indicator
(Cronbach alpha = 0.80). The second measurement attempted to establish the
importance of sales support (support activities), and was based on an item
originally developed by Cravens et al. (1993). A second item was developed to
assess the percentage of time (0% to 100%) spent on sales support activities
(importance of support). To detect the presence of team sales (team sales), we
used the instrument developed by John and Weitz (1989), comprising five items
measured on a seven-point Likert scale. Factor analysis revealed an internal
confidence indicator similar to that obtained by John and Weitz (1989)
(Cronbach = 0.78 vs. 0.76).
For measuring the level of market uncertainty, we used four indicators: market
share, growth potential, number of meetings to close a sale and duration of
meetings. The literature suggests that the product/service development stage is a
good indicator of the level of uncertainty. We opted for the Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) matrix. Respondents were asked to situate the product (or
products, where applicable) on one of two axes. A product with high growth
potential (growth potential, coded 1) or a product holding a major market share
(market share, coded 1) indicated a low level of uncertainty. To assess the sales
cycle, we used two items: the time needed to close a sale (time to close, hour
indicator) and the number of meetings needed to close a sale (number of
meetings).
The products resources available to the salespeople were measured by three
items: complementarity in the range of products/services (complementary
Product, yes=1), the possibility of adapting the products/services (product
adaptability, yes=1) and the availability of particular resources (Resource
availability) to salespeople (e.g. the possibility of negotiating prices with
customers, offering discounts on sales, credit, installation or special delivery
terms). To operationalize this item, we counted the total number of resources
available to create an overall score for each establishment. A further type of
resource is the expense account. To assess its presence and identify the type of
expenses covered by the organization, we based our question on the measure
used by Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992). Respondents were asked to indicate
which of the expenses in the list provided were covered by the organization (e.g.
car, gas, meals, promotion expenses). We then counted the number of expense
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items for each organization to obtain an overall score (number of expenses). We
also asked whether the organization had a discretionary expense account
(discretionary expense, yes=1) and its amount in dollars (size of expense
account). The larger the expense account, the lower the level of uncertainty.
To assess the resource dependence perspective, we used five measures: number
of years of sales experience (sales experience), level of education (education),
level of difference in salesperson performance (performance differential), using a
0% to 100% scale [0% (1) to 100% (7)], sales staff turnover (turnover), which
represents the percentage of employees who leave the establishment each year
and the predominance of the sales team in the organization’s marketing strategy
(sales predominance). A scale based on the work of Hurwich and Moynahan
(1988) was developed to assess the importance (from 0% to 100%) placed by the
organization on the various elements of the marketing mix (sales team, publicity,
service, price, quality, distribution, R&D). A low percentage for the sales team
was taken to indicate a low predominance in the organization’s marketing
strategy.
The transaction cost analysis theory concept tested in this study was the presence
of transaction-specific assets. This was measured using four items: training
effort required (training effort), assessed on a five-point Likert scale, training
budget (training budget), the presence of a career plan (career plan, yes=1) and
the number of reporting levels in sales function (number of Levels).
Two control variables were used: establishment size and economic sector. As the
establishment size indicator, we selected annual sales turnover (size). For
identification of the economic sector, we drew heavily from the classification
system developed by a large Canadian consulting firm that conducts periodic
surveys of sales compensation. Five sectors were listed: manufacturing
(Manufacturing), finance, insurance and real estate (financial), retail trade
(retail), services (services) and transportation, communications and public
utilities (communications). Each sector was treated as a dummy variable (0 and
1) in comparison with a fifth category "other sectors" (others).
Measuring the Dependent
Our dependent variable in the study was the salary component in total sales
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compensation. To measure it, we asked respondents to indicate, on a scale from
1 to 100, the proportion of salary paid as a percentage of total average sales
compensation. A low percentage (e.g. between 0% and 10%) indicated a
commission-based compensation policy, whereas a very high percentage (e.g.
90% to 100%) indicated a mainly salary-based compensation policy. Stroh et al.,
(1996) argue that the properties of proportions are more attractive than those of
ratio: proportions are bounded between zero and one, and are thus readily
interpretable, but ratios range from zero to infinity.
Analysis
The hypotheses were tested using hierarchical multiple regression analysis. In
the fist step we entered the organizational control variables. Then we introduced
the information on the agent performance construct, followed by the uncertainty
construct. In the fourth step we entered the TAC variables and in the fifth step
the resource dependence variables were entered. In the last step the results of full
model is presented. We applied usefulness analysis to assess the additional
contribution of each construct in explaining the role of salary (Darlington, 1968).
The coefficient estimates for each of the equations should be viewed with
caution, since the dependent variable--assessed as a salary percentage--is not
distributed normally. Like John and Weitz (1989), we examined the impact of
this distribution. The model was estimated using a logit model with a sample
limited to observation of entirely salary-based plans and entirely commission-
based plans. The results turned out to be fairly similar. In all cases, the
coefficient signs were not affected by procedural changes. Where the logit
transformation was used on the dependent variable (0 = commission, 1 = salary),
the model’s explanatory power was reduced because of the weak contribution of
the control variable financial sector.
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations and correlation matrix for all the
variables examined. According to the matrix, there was no excessive
intercorrelation problem (>0.90). The maximum level of intercorrelation
observed was 0.51, suggesting that the model variables are fairly independent.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables (N = 325)
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1- Proporsal 46.8 37.7 ---
2- Programmation 2.1 .70 -.21 ---
3- Ratio .18 .13 .16 .09 ---
4- Workplace .70 .46 .09 .01 .16 ---
5- Measure of results 13.8 4.5 -.14 .07 -.21 -.02 ---
6- Days on the road 4.1 .87 -.06 -.11 -.23 .01 .12 ---
7- Support activities .55 .15 .02 .07 -.20 .34 .09 .12 ---
8- Importance of support 2.95 1.47 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.12 .06 -.18 .01 ---
9- Team sales 19.1 6.1 .25 -.02 .18 .02 -.03 -.23 .24 .10 ---
10- Market shares .84 .37 .18 -.10 -.02 .01 .01 .08 -.19 .05 .05
11- Growth potential .56 .50 .01 .16 -.05 .03 .05 -.02 .08 .03 .01
12 Number of meetings 5.5 23.6 .05 .08 -.04 -.05 .05 -.05 -.04 .03 .08
13- Time to close a sale 2.6 1.2 .05 .14 .03 -.22 -.09 -.07 -.17 .14 .24
14- Resources availability 2.72 1.47 .23 .02 .16 -.10 .14 -.09 -.11 -.02 .23
15 Product adaptability .86 .34 .18 -.09 .04 -.08 -.11 .21 -.10 -.08 -.08
16- Product complementarity .87 .34 .14 .01 -.02 -.07 -.04 .07 .02 .03 .01
17- Expenses account .23 .42 -.29 .09 -.07 .22 .01 .07 .16 -.02 -.24
18- Size of expenses 3.63 1.83 .03 .22 -.06 .25 -.16 -.04 .03 .11 .16
19- Number of expenses 6.16 3.87 .53 -.28 .10 -.26 -.09 -.05 -.27 .06 .27
20- Training effort 3.88 .93 -.04 .06 -.02 -.03 .22 .05 -.05 .13 .10
21- Training budget 3.05 1.39 -.02 .01 -.28 -.09 .30 .05 .04 .01 -.01
22- Career plan .50 .50 .05 .11 .14 .13 -.21 .03 -.07 -.06 .10
23- Number of levels 3.44 1.35 .14 -.24 -.15 -.08 .09 .07 .07 .01 -.10
24- Sale predominance 3.19 1.52 -.19 .01 -.12 -.18 .10 .06 -.02 .10 -.18
25- Performance differential 4.40 1.42 -.37 .08 -.14 -.10 .11 -.05 .04 -.01 -.10
26- Experience 2.40 .95 .02 -.11 .04 -.19 -.09 .03 -.20 .13 .14
27- Education 1.95 .70 .16 -.01 -.04 -.14 -.02 -.11 -.16 .01 .09
28- Turnover 1.96 1.28 -.20 .22 .02 .20 .04 .05 .15 -.10 -.16
29- Size of firm 4.4 2.2 .41 -.12 -.06 -.03 .01 .01 .01 -.07 .15
30- Retail .17 .37 -.10 .30 .27 .46 .06 -.06 .20 -.09 -.03
31- Manufacturing .32 .47 .28 -.27 -.01 -.35 -.09 .25 -.21 -.03 .09
32- Financial .27 .45 -.44 .02 -.25 -.09 .07 -.02 -.01 .08 -.22
33- Services .06 .24 .10 .03 .08 .09 -.07 -.03 .05 -.01 .14
34- Communication .14 .35 .19 .02 -.04 .03 .02 -.22 .05 .04 .15
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Table 1 (cont’d)
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
---
-.03 ---
.08 .05 ---
-.04 -.06 .20 ---
.17 .03 .18 .14 ---
.10 -.16 -.04 .09 -.09 ---
.13 .08 -.04 .03 .07 .16 ---
-.15 -.02 -.13 -.09 -.23 .01 -.11 ---
.11 .01 .05 .27 -.11 -.16 .06 .10 ---
.24 -.07 .05 .25 .37 .13 .20 -.45 .01 ---
-.08 .14 .06 .07 -.03 -.14 -.08 .10 .15 .01 ---
.08 .06 .04 -.06 .01 -.07 -.03 .02 -.10 -.03 .20 ---
-.09 -.10 .02 .10 .02 .04 .10 .04 .14 .01 -.25 -.29 ---
.07 .04 .01 -.13 .03 .01 .01 -.04 .04 .09 .27 .37 -.41 ---
.11 .11 -.02 .01 -.02 -.05 -.16 .04 .21 -.20 .20 .04 -.22 .09 ---
.10 .10 .06 -.02 .16 -.12 .08 .18 .23 .32 .08 .13 .10 .10 .22
-.06 -.06 -.02 .07 .11 .04 .01 -.26 .08 .30 -.09 .01 .11 -.11 -.09
.21 .21 .04 .25 .02 .06 -.03 -.14 .23 .21 .21 .12 -.21 .13 .12
-.17 .06 -.05 -.08 -.15 -.04 -.06 .23 -.08 -.38 .08 .07 -.08 .07 .17
.13 -.06 -.02 .09 .20 .19 .21 -.14 .06 .39 -.10 .28 .03 .26 -.19
-.07 -.06 .09 -.12 .12 .01 .01 .17 -.07 -.21 -.09 .01 .12 -.09 -.11
.17 -.16 .03 .14 .21 .20 .23 -.26 -.05 .51 -.05 .05 .10 .01 -.16
-.18 .09 -.07 -.13 -.47 -.18 -.23 .24 .33 -.44 .21 .09 -.22 .10 .29
.02 .09 -.03 .01 .02 -.06 -.04 -.02 -.22 .01 -.13 -.21 -.04 -.12 -.02
.02 .09 -.02 .11 .16 -.05 -.04 -.11 .07 .11 .02 .06 .04 .03 .01
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Variables 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
1- Proporsal
2- Programmation
3- Ratio
4- Workplace
5- Measure of results
6- Days on the road
7- Support activities
8- Importance of support
9- Team sales
10- Market shares
11- Growth potential
12 Number of meetings
13- Time to close a sale
14- Resources availability
15 Product adaptability
16- Product complementarity
17- Expenses account
18- Size of expenses
19- Number of expenses
20- Training effort
21- Training budget
22- Career plan
23- Number of levels
24- Sale predominance
25- Performance differential ---
26- Experience -.11 ---
27- Education .04 -.12 ---
28- Turnover .19 -.42 -.08 ---
29- Size of firm .19 .17 .08 -.24 ---
30- Retail .01 -.06 -.22 .23 .09 ---
31- Manufacturing .30 .24 .06 -.29 .19 -.31 ---
32- Financial .36 -.13 .01 .16 -.29 -.27 -.42 ---
33- Services -.08 -.04 .12 -.08 -.01 -.11 -.18 -.16 ---
34- Communication -.01 -.03 .08 .03 .04 -.18 -.28 -.25 -.11 ---
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Results
Table 2 shows the results for the different models using regression analysis.
The first model regressed the proportion of salary on organization control
variables. This model was significant (F=13.68, p.<.01, adjusted R2=.23).
Organizational size (β = .28, p< .01) is positively related to a salary-based
compensation strategy. Two economic sectors stand out in particular.
Compared with other sectors, the salary component was found to be smaller,
or the incentive component greater, in the retail trade sector ( β =-.24, p< .05)
and the finance and insurance sector ( β=-.43, p< .01). The regression
coefficients in the combined model (Model 6) show that size and sector are
particularly robust and accurate predictors of the type of sales compensation
paid.
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Table 2: Results of Regression Analysis for Proportion of Pay a (N=300)
Variables ControlVariables
Performance
Information
Sales
Uncertainty
Specific
Assets
Resource
Dependence
Full
Model
Size   .28***  .18***
Retail  -.24*** -.28***
Manufacturing  -.01 -.09
Financial  -.44*** -.25***
Comunication   .03 -.04
Services   .01 -.04
Programmability   .23*** -.08
Span of Control   .11**  .12**
Workplace  -.09 -.18***
Measure of outputs  -.10* -.05
Days on the road  -.01 -.03
Support activities   .09  .11**
Importance of support  -.02  .01
Team sales   .24***  .10**
Market share   .03  .01
Growth potential   .03  .03
Number of meetings   .06  .10**
Time to close a sale  -.10* -.09*
Resource availability  -.07 -.07
Product adaptability  -.14*** -.11**
Product complementary  -.02 -.01
Expense account   .08  .08
Size of account   .03  .03
Number of expenses   .48***  .27***
Training effort  -.06  .02
Training budget  -.04  .03
Career plan  -.10* -.03
Number of levels   .21***  .07
Sale experience  -.06 -.11**
Education   .16***  .06
Sale predominance  -.10*  .02
Performance differential  -.34*** -.15***
Turnover  -.13** -.01
Multiple R   .50   .38   .54   .19   .43  .72
R2   .25   .14   .29   .04   .19  .51
Adjusted R2   .23   .12   .27   .03   .17  .46
F 13.68*** 6.4*** 12.13*** 3.0** 13.9*** 27.5***
                                                
a
 Standardized regression coefficents    * p<.10    ** p<.05    *** p<.01
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The second model presents the results of information on agent performance
construct. The overall model was significant (F=6.4, p<.01, adjusted R2=.12).
The results concerning job programmability confirm hypothesis 1 which states
that high programmability is related to a larger salary component in total
compensation (β=-.23, p< .01). However, the explanatory power of this
variable appeared to be relatively weak, since this indicator made a non-
significant independent contribution when the parameters of the other
constructs were included (see model 6). The capacity to observe the behavior
of the salespeople partly explains the proportion of the salary component,
confirming hypothesis 2. Where the sales force works mainly from the office
(β=-.10, p< .10, β = -.19, p<.01 in full model), and is closely supervised (
β=.11, p< .05, β= .12, p<.05 in full model), sales staff tend to receive a larger
percentage of their total compensation in the form of salary. The difficulty of
measuring outcomes (β=-.10, p<.10) was also positively related to a larger
salary component in total compensation. The results also show that where
sales requires interventions from several people to close a sale (β=.24, p< .01,
β = .10, p<.05 in full model), and where performance of sales support
activities is necessary (β=.11, p<.05 in full model 6), the sales staff received a
larger percentage of their total compensation in the form of salary. These
results support hypotheses 3A, B and C.
Regarding sales environment uncertainty, the results show that model 3 is
significant (F=12,13, p<.01, adjusted R2= .27). Hypothesis 4, however, is not
supported. None of the variables related to uncertainty concerning sale
outcomes (market share, potential growth, number of meetings and time to
close a sale) made an independent contribution of up to .05. The results
revealed, however, that the resources related to the product or services and the
financial resources are significant predictors of the type of sales compensation
paid. The more freedom salespeople have in adapting the product to suit
customer requirements (β=-.14, p < .01, β = -.11, p<.05 in the full model), the
more likely it is that salespeople will be paid in the form of variable pay.
Moreover, the more sales-related expenses the organization agrees to pay
(β=.48, p<.01, β = .27, p<.01 in the full model), the more likely it is that
salespeople will be paid by salary. If hypothesis 5 is supported, the results
concerning financial resources contradicted hypothesis 6. We will return to
this latter point later in the discussion.
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Model 4 assessed the contribution of the transaction-specific asset construct.
The model was significant (F=3.0, p<.05), but the contribution of TSA
measures studied was very low, explaining only 3% of the salary percentage
variance in total compensation. However, the results partly support our
hypothesis 7 which states that where assets are firm-specific, the firm will tend
to pay a higher percentage of salary. Organizations with more reporting levels
in the sales function (β=.21, p< .01) and those who provide a career plan for
their salespeople (β=-.10, p<.10) tended to pay a higher percentage of salary.
Neither training effort nor training budget made a significant contribution.
Model 5 presents the results of the resource dependence construct. The overall
model was significant (F=13.9, p<.01, adjusted R2=.17). Hypotheses 8 to 12
were partly supported. The higher the differential between the performance of
salespeople working for the same establishment (β=-.34, p< .01, β = -.15,
p<.01 in full model), the stronger the predominance of the role of salespersons
in closing sales (β=-.10, p<.10) and the higher the level of sales staff turnover
(β= -.13, p<.05), the smaller the salary component in total compensation. The
results for professional competency were somewhat contradictory and non-
robust, showing that a better-educated sales force (β=16, p< .05 in model 5,
but non-significant in the full model) will be paid a larger salary component,
and a more experienced salesperson will receive a larger incentive component
(β=11, p<.05 in full model, but non-significant in model 5).
As for the additional value of each construct studied, Table 3 presents the
results of the usefulness analysis. The analysis assesses the incremental
contribution of a specific construct after taking into account the influence of
all other constructs and variables. The table shows that addition of
organization control variables (∆R2= = .05, F=5.1, p<.01), of information on
agent performance (∆R2= = .06, F=4.3, p<.01), sales uncertainty (∆R2= = .07,
F=3.7, p<.01), and resource dependence constructs (∆R2= = .03, F=3.8, p<.01)
resulted in significant improvement of R2 in the proportion of salary. The
addition of the TSA construct did not result in a significant improvement in a
R 2 (∆R2= = .01, F=.78, p<.34).
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Table 3: Results of Usefulness Analysis
∆ R2 F
Control variables beyond Performance information,
Uncertainty, Specific Assets, Resource dependence .05  5.3**
Performance Information beyond Control variables,
Uncertainty, Specific Assets, Resource dependence .06  4.3**
Uncertainty beyond Control variables, Performance
Information, Specific Assets, Resource dependence .07  3.7**
Specific Assests beyond Control variables, Performance
Information, Uncertainty, Resource dependence .01  .80
Dependence Resource beyond Control variables,
Performance Information, Uncertainty, Specific Assets .03  3.8**
** p < .01
Discussion
The contribution of this paper is that its empirical research investigates three
major theoretical frameworks relating to sales compensation: agency theory,
transaction cost analysis, and resource dependence theory. The findings
suggest that variables derived from these three theories yield more powerful
and useful insights into the role of salary in the context of sales than one
individual perspective alone. The full model explained 46% of variance in the
proportion of salary compared with 12% for the agent information
performance model, 27% for the ales uncertainty model, 17% for the resource
dependence model and 3% for the transaction-specific assets model. The
usefulness analysis has also shown, that except for transaction-specific asset
constructs, all of the other constructs derived from organizational theories
provided robust independent contributions in explaining sales compensation.
The data for this study were collected from French-speaking Canadian
respondents, providing a different cultural context from previous research
gathered from English-speaking employees. This study suggests that
constructs and variables derived from the perspectives studied can be applied
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to diverse cultural environments.
Regarding specific results, as we postulated in hypothesis 1, high job
programmability is related to a larger salary component in total compensation.
As predicted, organizations appear to use incentives or variable pay to align
the goals of their salespeople with those of organizations when tasks are less
programmable. Although the contribution of this concept is fairly modest and
robust, the results partly confirm Eisenhardt’s (1985, 1988) findings regarding
sales force and Stroh et al., (1996) for middle-level managers. It should be
remembered, however, that Eisenhardt worked on a very specific sector - shoe
manufacturing - whereas our own research spanned a variety of sectors.
Moreover, several of the organizations in our sample manufactured and sold a
wide range of products or services, and the choice of responses may not have
been universally appropriate. Therefore, perhaps it is better to work with
sector-specific programmability constructs.
Regarding hypothesis 2, the influence of the possibility of observing behavior
was confirmed. The results concerning the workplace revealed that sales staff
are paid a higher percentage of salary when they are mainly office-based, and
a higher percentage of commissions when they work mainly outside the office
or on the road. Surprisingly, the number of days on the road had no effect on
the compensation strategy. We found that when salespeople spent less than
two days on the road, they were paid a higher percentage of salary (63%), and
when they spent more than half the week outside the office (3 days or more),
they tended to be paid more on results. However, the percentage did not
subsequently vary according to the number of days. As far as we know, this
research is the first to have highlighted the impact of the workplace on sales
compensation. As expected, the supervision ratio had a positive impact on the
salary component. Our hypothesis on the impact of behavioral observation,
and consequently Eisenhardt’s (1985) conclusions, are thus confirmed. The
lower the span of control for the sales managers, the easier it is to supervise
salespeople and observe their behaviour, and the less useful incentive
compensation will be. Like John and Weitz (1989), and in accordance with
hypothesis 3, we observed that the difficulty of measuring sales performance
in the form of outcomes had a negative impact on the salary percentage. The
positive impact of sales support activities and teamwork on the salary
component was confirmed. Like Anderson (1985) and Cravens et al. (1993),
we found a relationship between the scope of sales support activities and a
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larger salary component in total compensation. This result suggests that, to
motivate salespeople to perform nonselling tasks or activities, organizations
should provide them with more pay stability. As for the importance of team
selling, our results confirmed those of John and Weitz (1989) and Cravens et
al. (1993) for the same type of population. It would be interesting, in future
research, to see whether organizations that encourage teamwork opt for group
or individual compensation.
Our results concerning hypothesis 4, related to concept of uncertainty with
respect to agency theory, show that uncertainty sales outcomes has no
influence on compensation strategy. However, we observed a positive
correlation (r = 0.18, p < .05) between market share and salary percentage.
This may be due to the instrument used. Some respondents were perhaps not
familiar with the BCG grid, which required them to situate their product along
one of two axes. Establishments with extensive product ranges must have
found this difficult. In addition, we cannot dismiss the social desirability bias.
Few organizations are proud of selling so-called "dead wood" products or
services. The impact of the number of meetings and the time required to close
a sale was found to be limited. In both cases, the relationship with salary
percentage was U-shaped. The salary percentage was relatively high in
contexts with low levels of uncertainty (fast closure of sales), then dropped
steeply in contexts with average uncertainty, and rose again in contexts with
very high uncertainty (long, difficult closures). We have assessed these
curvilinear relationships by transforming independent variables in square
terms. The results show that square terms created a marginal improvement
over the linear model (β=.07 and β=-.08, p<.10). This suggests that the
concept of uncertainty requires a much more sophisticated examination than
the literature would have us believe.
In keeping with hypothesis 5, our results showed that product-related
resources were negatively related to salary percentage. The more flexibility
the sales force has in adapting products and services to suit specific customers
or consumer needs, the smaller the salary component in their total
compensation. This result is consistent with the findings of John and Weitz
(1989). However, since the hypotheses underlying the other construct
variables were not verified (complementary products and particular
resources), it would be premature to conclude that product/service-related
resources have an impact on sales compensation. With respect to hypothesis 6,
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bearing on financial resources, our results show that the total number of
expenses paid by the organization has a positive impact on salary percentage.
This is a direct contradiction of our hypothesis. We found that the more
willing organizations were to pay sales expenses, the more likely they were to
pay their sales staff a higher salary percentage. A possible explanation for this
is that some reimbursable expenses are classified as fringe benefits or "perks"
for the sales team. If this were the case, reimbursement of selling expenses
would not be considered when establishing compensation policies, but would
instead be part of the fringe benefit package. This assumption was supported
by a fairly high correlation (r = .25, p < .01) between the seniority of
salespeople, sales staff turnover (r = -.37; p < .01) and the total number of
expenses paid by the organization. As fringe benefits usually increase with
seniority and decrease with staff turnover, our argument seems well founded.
If we push this line of reasoning further, it is not improbable that
reimbursement of selling expenses is offered instead of or in exchange for
incentive compensation. Some organizations, knowing their salespeople have
a natural aversion to risk, have agreed to pay some sales expenses instead of
increasing the commission or performance bonus component of total
compensation. There may also be tax-related reasons for the strategy. Sales
people are less likely to pay taxes on business meals or travel than they would
on sales bonuses and commissions.
The study showed that human assets specifically required to perform the job,
the specific attribute of the transaction cost analysis perspective, plays a
significant but limited role in explaining sales compensation practices. As
expressed by hypothesis 7, the presence of the career plan and the number of
reporting levels in the sales function were found to be particularly useful asset
specificity indicators for understanding the type of compensation paid.
Although our results confirm those obtained by Coughlan and Narasimhan
(1992) to a point, our analyses also revealed that compensation policies are
determined most strongly by actual prospects for promotion than by the
presence of a formal career plan. The more reporting levels in the sales
function within an organization, the better the future salary prospects, and the
greater the incentive provided. Finally, like John and Weitz (1989) and
Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992), we found no significant relationship
between investment in training and sales compensation strategy. These
inconclusive results may be explained by the difficulty of accurately
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measuring the actual training effort for a particular group of employees, and
the reticence of firms to reveal their figures.
The results show that the resource dependence perspective is a useful
framework to explain salary strategy. Contrary to hypothesis 8, we observed
that experience in selling was negatively related to the percentage of salary
paid. Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) observed the same relationship. This
suggests that organizations may be aware of the importance of recognizing the
marginal contribution of experienced salespeople and the need to retain these
valuable resources. Additionally, when experience in sales increases, so does
accountability (Kowtha, 1997). The increase in the level of accountability for
results required a shift in direction of a higher proportion of variable pay. The
impact of the level of education on the salary component was confirmed.
Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) had observed a similar relationship. This
result may be explained by the fact that a hiring policy requiring a higher level
of education creates a greater entry barrier, and consequently pressure for a
greater salary component in total compensation (Moynahan and Locke, 1988).
Alternately, salespeople who have made a significant investment in human
capital are well positioned to demand safer compensation because of the value of
their assets on the job market (Lal and Srinivasan, 1993; Basu et al., 1985).
Hypothsis 9, suggesting that the difference between the performance of an
average salesperson and the performance of an exceptional salesperson will be
negatively related to the size of the salary component in total compensation,
has been fully confirmed. This research is the first to have identified such a
relationship, and clarifies wage survey data indicating substantial differences
in income between average and exceptional salespeople paid under variable
compensation programs. This result may be explained by the fact that the best
performers are generally more attractive and have better opportunities on the
market. They can thus find it easier to leave for a rival firm or start their own
business. Sharing organizational or individual success with these employees
apparently represents an indicated compensation strategy to retain these
valuable salespeople.
However, hypothesis 11 concerning the impact of sales force predominance in
the organization’s marketing strategy was partly supported. We observed a
small negative relationship between the degree of predominance of the sales
force and the proportion of the salary component. We believe that sales force
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predominance must be alongside other marketing mix elements. More detailed
analysis is required to identify emergent marketing strategies and assess
whether particular configurations explain sales compensation policies more
effectively. In accordance with hypothesis 12 we found a negative relationship
between sales staff turnover and the size of the salary component in total
compensation. This may suggest that it is easier to replace the sales team, and
supports the argument that where the level of human resource dependence is
low, organizations should let the market rule.
Lastly, concerning the influence of organizational variables, our results show
that the size of the establishment is positively related to salary percentage. The
most plausible explanation for this is that large firms have more financial
resources and can take advantage of economies of scale that allow them to pay
a larger salary component. Our analyses showed that the salary percentage
increased with size regardless of the sales environment, sector, type of product
or sales force characteristics. According to institutional theory, it is more
difficult to change compensation policies and adapt them to new sales contexts
as size increases (Greening & Gray, 1994; Barringer & Milkovich, 1998)
Reducing the salary percentage or replacing it with more incentive-based
compensation appears to be a somewhat delicate operation, and one that is
difficult to justify to employees in large organizations. It should also be
remembered that size is a determining factor in pay surveys (Crystal, 1991).
Firms commonly compare themselves with other firms of the same size.
Moreover, our cross-sectional data do not allow us to advance that
organizational size is a factor of institutionalization of pay policies. Our
results suggest, however, that the role of size must be explored more carefully
in studies of compensation. In this regard, institutional theory is a useful
framework for measuring how external agents (e.g. governments, professional
associations, survey firms) and internal pressure agents (e,g, unions, group
interests) in medium and larger organizations influence the choice of pay
strategies.
Our research also showed the influence of the sector. Similar to Stroh et al.
(1996), we observed that retail and financial industries used a higher
proportion of variable pay. Distribution analysis of salary percentages by
sector showed strong similarities in some subsectors, especially insurance and
car sales. Although there are some similarities in products and markets in a
given sector, this does not justify the fact that most establishments in that
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sector adopt the same sales compensation policies. As Crystal (1991)
observed for senior managers, pay surveys may perpetuate compensation
policies in a given sector. Although our analyses were not revealed to be a
good evidence of isomorphism by tradition, as Eisenhardt (1988)
demonstrated, a form of isomorphism by imitation nevertheless probably
exists in the field of sales compensation. However, the importance of industry
membership suggests that studies seeking to test organizational control theory
predictions in the field of compensation must take into account this
organizational characteristic.
Avenues for future research
Our study led us to identify a number of avenues for future research. Although
our research is the first in field of sales compensation to have integrated basic
constructs related to agency, transactional cost analysis and resource
dependence perspectives, the consideration of institutional theory may add
useful insights into compensation decision-making. Following John and
Weitz’s (1989) reasoning, it would be interesting to develop a conceptual
framework and test the causal links between organizational control theory
variables. The framework proposed by Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) is an
interesting starting point. As they suggest, do the product characteristics,
market predominance and span of control have only an indirect effect on
compensation strategies as moderated by job design? So far, researchers have
concentrated on explaining the use of salary or commission, the size of the
salary component in total compensation and the level of salary. Sales
compensation is much more complex, and takes many different forms (e.g.
salary and bonus, salary and commission, salary, bonus and commission). It
would be interesting to explore why organizations opt for one particular
combination rather than another, and the importance of commissions and
bonuses. To our knowledge, no research to date has tested the effectiveness of
the theoretical models by sector. Can the same determinants be generalized
over several sectors? Do service firms differ from manufacturing firms?
Another promising avenue for future research would be to examine the
effectiveness of compensation programs, as did Cravens et al. (1993),
Harrison et al., (1996) and Banker et al. (1996). Are organizations that comply
with the theoretical basics more effective than others? As the results of
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Cravens et al. suggest, are certain forms of compensation more effective than
others in specific sales activities? In what context should bonuses be offered
instead of commissions? Our research also enabled us to test the foundations
of the main emerging theories in sales compensation, in a cultural context
other than American. Although to a large extent our results have confirmed
those obtained by other researchers, it is nevertheless important, in light of the
growing trend toward market globalization, to perform comparative studies in
order to identify the extent to which the cultural environment and values act
on the determinants and effectiveness of sales compensation policies.
Limitations and practical implications
Despite its contributions, this study had a number of limitations. First, despite
the large number of respondents, our sampling of the sales team was not
designed to be representative of industries. The sample method restricted our
ability to extend the results to other sales organizations. Second, the methods
used to gather and analyze the data should be considered. The research design
was cross-sectional, and it is thus not possible to infer a causal relationship.
The third limitation is that all variables, both independent and dependent,
derive from the same questionnaire. This raises concerns about share variance
due to a common measurement method. No statistical technique provides
proof of causation. A structural equation under LISREL could be used to
overcome this problem, as it would factor in measurement errors in variable
estimates (Brannick, 1995). Fourth, our units of analysis were sales managers.
If we had used human resources managers or salespeople, our results may
have been different. This underscores the importance of adopting more than
one standpoint. Despite these limits, however, our research has confirmed the
relevance of considering several theoretical approaches and using multi-
disciplinary research to understand why organizations decide on a particular
compensation policy for their sales staff.
The key implication for management that comes from this study is that sales
compensation is complex and it takes a broad set of sales units and
organizational factors to define the proper mix between salary and variable
pay. Findings from our hypotheses suggest that managers responsible for sales
compensation must be aware that the nature and environment of selling
33
activities, resources offered to salespeople, the strategy of human resources
management and the qualities of human resources may influence the design of
optimal pay policies. More specifically, in organizations where the span of
control is high, where the sales force performs non-selling activities, sales
closing requires teamwork and considerable time, several expenses related to
selling activities are offered and many career opportunities exist, a high salary
component seems to be the most indicated strategy. Conversely, in
organizations where the products or services are not standardized, that is to
say, the sales force can adapt them to meet the needs of customers, selling
activities principally take place outside of the establishment and there is a
broad disparity in performance and experience between salespeople, high
variable pay would be the preferred strategy. Organizations that determine
their pay strategy by simply imitating their competitors’ pay strategies without
considering sales and individual factors identified in this study are likely to
attain a less desirable mix between salary and variable pay, and thus may lose
a potential competitive opportunity.
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Appendix 1: Summary of Variables and Abbreviations
Variables Description Key constructs
Proportion of salary Salary component in total compensation ( %) Dependent variable
Programmability Customer’s effort in purchase. (1) low, (3) high Programmability
Ratio Number of supervisors to number of salespeople Observation
Workplace On the road (1) or in the office (0) Observation
Days on the road Number of days on the road (1-5) Observation
Measure of outputs Three items assessing the ease with which the results
can be measured (1) disagree (7) agree
Measure of outcomes
Support activities Sales support activities (yes=0, no=1) Measure of outcomes
Support importance Percentage granted to sales support (0%-100%) in five
categories
Measure of outcomes
Team sales Five items assessing the need for cooperation 
In closing sales (1) disagree (7) agree
Measure of outcomes
Growth potential Product with growth potential (yes=1,no=0) Sales uncertainty
Market share Relative market share (1=high, 0=low) Sales uncertainty
Time to close a sale Time needed to close a sale (hours) Sales uncertainty
Number of meetings Number of meetings to close a sale Sales uncertainty
Product adaptability Product adaptability (yes=1, no=0) Product resources
Product
complementary
Product complementarity (yes=1, no=0) Product resources
Resources
availability
Number of resources available to salespeople
(possibility of six)
Product resources
Discretionary
expenses
Existence of a discretionary expenses account (yes=1,
no=0)
Financial resources
Size of expenses Size of expense account per month ($ in 5 categories) Financial resources
Number of expenses Number of expenses covered by the organization Financial resources
Training effort Training effort required (1) minimal, (7) major Specific assests
Training budget Training budget ($ in six categories) Specific assests
Career plan Presence of formal career plan (yes=1) Specific assests
Number of levels Number of reporting levels in the sales function Specific assests
Sale predominance Percentage accorded to sales team in the marketing mix
(0% to 100% in six categories)
Marginal productivity
Performance
differential
Differential between salespeople performance
(1) no difference, (7) more 100%
Marginal productivity
Education Level of education (1) secondary, (4) Master’s Competency
Experience Experience in sales (years, in four categories) Competency
Turnover Staff turnover (% in six categories) Competency
Size of firm Turnover ($ in six digit) Control variable
Retail Retail sector (1) others (0) Control variable
Manufacturing Manufacturing sector (1) others (0) Control variable
Financial Finance, insurance and real estate sector (1) others (0) Control variable
Services Services sector (1) others (0) Control variable
Communication Communication / transport/public utilities (1) others (0) Control variable
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